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Compositional Game Theory
Neil Ghani Jules Hedges Viktor Winschel Philipp Zahn
Abstract—We introduce open games as a compositional foundation
of economic game theory. A compositional approach potentially allows
methods of game theory and theoretical computer science to be applied
to large-scale economic models for which standard economic tools are not
practical. An open game represents a game played relative to an arbitrary
environment and to this end we introduce the concept of coutility, which
is the utility generated by an open game and returned to its environment.
Open games are the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category and
can therefore be composed by categorical composition into sequential
move games and by monoidal products into simultaneous move games.
Open games can be represented by string diagrams which provide an
intuitive but formal visualisation of the information flows. We show that a
variety of games can be faithfully represented as open games in the sense
of having the same Nash equilibria and off-equilibrium best responses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of compositionality is well-known and almost com-
monplace in computer science, where it is what ultimately allows
programmers to scale software to large systems. However, in many
other fields compositionality is essentially unknown and hence its
benefits are not available. In this paper we introduce compositionality
into a field where one might not believe it to be possible: the
study of strategic games and Nash equilibria. They are of interest in
economics and computer science where optimal decisions are taken
by interacting agents with conflicting goals.1
In contrast to classical game theory, where games are studied
monolithically as one global object, compositional game theory works
bottom-up by building large and complex games from smaller com-
ponents. Such an approach is inherently difficult since the interaction
between games has to be considered. Moreover, in the compositional
approach, the equilibria of larger games should be defined from the
equilibria of the component games - but a priori, there is no reason
why this should be possible.
For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, each player’s best
option is to defect, although, if they acted as a single agent, they
would cooperate. Moreover, if the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game
is repeated, then cooperative equilibria become achievable. More
generally, the equilibria of a composite game are not necessarily
made up from those of the component games, and locally optimal
moves are not guaranteed to be globally optimal. In essence, game
theory contains emergent effects whereby a composite system exhibits
behaviours that are not (simple) functions of the behaviours of the
components. Accordingly, emergent effects make compositionality
very hard to achieve and the existence of a compositional model
of game theory is somewhat surprising. In order to arrive at this
goal we had to radically reformulate classical game theory from first
principles and rebuild it on open games.
Open games represent the relationship between different interac-
tions in two dimensions: in sequence, if an interaction follows another
interaction and in parallel, if interactions take place simultaneously.
As such, we follow a path taken in the field of open systems [21], and
in particular categorical open systems [6] where compositional ap-
proaches to general systems are studied. Here, systems are modelled
1Games in the sense of game semantics are compositional, but they avoid
several difficult defining features of game theory by restricting to the 2-player
zero-sum setting.
as morphisms f : X → Y in a symmetric monoidal category, where
the objects X and Y describe the boundaries of the open system,
where it interacts with its environment. This means that systems
f : X → Y and f ′ : X ′ → Y ′ can be composed in parallel using
the monoidal product to yield f ⊗ f ′ : X ⊗X ′ → Y ⊗ Y ′, and two
systems f : X → Y and g : Y → Z sharing a common boundary
can be composed sequentially by glueing along this boundary to yield
g◦f : X → Z. Ordinary, closed systems are recovered as scalars [1],
i.e. endomorphisms f : I → I of the monoidal unit, which represents
a trivial boundary. Open games are accordingly the morphisms of a
symmetric monoidal category.
A compositional model of game theory does not only have to model
a game but also the interactions of the game with all other games
and environments. This can be seen as a form of continuation passing
style. This would still be hardly tractable if the environment of an
open game included arbitrary other open games. The crucial technical
feature underlying our approach is to describe the behaviour of an
open game relative to a simplified notion of an environment which we
call a context, in which the future is abstracted into a single utility
function. In this way, we reduce an arbitrarily complex game to a
set of individual decisions. The circularity of a Nash equilibrium,
where all players play mutually best replies, is finally handled by the
composition operators.
The theory of open games is based on two main predecessors.
Firstly, in [17] games are defined as processes and in [2] the dynamics
but not the equilibria are treated compositionally. The second prede-
cessor is the theory of higher order games and selection functions,
for example in [4] and [12], which give a theory of equilibria relative
to an environment but are not strongly compositional. Selection
functions can be used to model goals of agents compositionally [11].
Combining features of these approaches into a single mathematical
object required the innovations mentioned above and led us to
discover the idea of an open game. After we developed open games,
connections to lenses and the geometry of interaction were noticed
respectively by Jeremy Gibbons and Tom Hirschowitz.
We omit proofs in this paper, which can be found in [8] and [10].
We also work over the category of sets to keep notation and overheads
to a minimum – for a full categorical account, see once more [8]. The
rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces
selection functions as a key ingredient to open games. Section III
introduces the definition of an open game and discusses its elements,
followed by some examples in Section IV. The monoidal category
of open games is introduced in Section V and the string diagrams
attached to this category in Section VI. We then turn to examples built
compositionally: in Section VII we discuss simultaneous move games
and in Section VIII sequential move games. Section IX concludes the
paper with an outlook on further work.
II. SELECTION FUNCTIONS AND HIGHER ORDER GAMES
For reasons of space, we assume the reader knows some basic
game theory, such as the definitions of normal-form and extensive-
form games and Nash equilibrium. These basic concepts can be found
for example in [13] or many online lecture notes. Neverthless, in this
section we introduce enough game theory via selection functions [4],
[12] to make the paper self contained.
Definition 1: An n-player higher order simultaneous move game
is defined by the following data:
• Sets X1, . . . , Xn of choices for each player
• A set R of outcomes
• An outcome function q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
• For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a multi-valued selection function
δi : (Xi → R)→ P(Xi)
In this game, each player simultaneously makes a choice of move
xi : Xi. We define a (pure) strategy for player i to be just a choice
in Xi, and a (pure) strategy profile to be a tuple of strategies in Σ :=∏n
i=1Xi. When all choices are made, the rules of the game determine
an outcome q(x1, . . . , xn) : R. The selection function δi : (Xi →
R) → P(Xi) defines the set of moves δi(k) that are considered
optimal in a context k : Xi → R, which describes the individual
decision faced by player i. A context for player i is obtained from
the outcome function by fixing strategies for all other players and
is thus the utility function associating, to each potential unilateral
deviation xi of player i, the utility arising from that deviation.
Given a higher order simultaneous move game, we define its best
response relation B ⊆ Σ × Σ by (σ, σ′) ∈ B iff for all players
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
σ
′
i ∈ δi(λ(xi : Xi).q(σ[i 7→ xi]))
where σ[i 7→ xi] is the strategy profile σ apart from the ith player
who chooses xi or, more formally,
(σ[i 7→ xi])j =
{
xi if i = j
σj otherwise
A selection equilibrium is a pure strategy profile σ with (σ, σ) ∈ B.
The classical definition of an n-player simultaneous move game in
normal form results from this definition as the special case in which
the set of outcomes is Rn and the ith player’s selection function is
δi(k) = argmax(πi ◦ k)
= {x : Xi | (k(x))i ≥ (k(x
′))i for all x
′ : Xi}
In this case the selection equilibria agree with the usual definition
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and moreover the best response
relation is the same. There are many well-known examples of 2-
player simultaneous move games with 2 moves each, such as the
prisoner’s dilemma, matching pennies, battle of the sexes, chicken,
etc., defined by different outcome functions q : {C,D}2 → R2. The
prisoner’s dilemma, for example, is given by the outcome function
q(C,C) = (2, 2) q(C,D) = (0, 3)
q(D,C) = (3, 0) q(D,D) = (1, 1)
and yields the constant best response relation with (σ, (D,D)) ∈ B
for all strategy profiles σ. This happens because D is a dominant
strategy for both players in the prisoner’s dilemma. An extended
example can be found in [12] of a higher order simultaneous move
game whose selection functions are not of this form, which we will
discuss in section VII.
Definition 2: An n-player higher order sequential game is defined
by the same data as a simultaneous move game: sets X1, . . . , Xn of
choices, a set R of outcomes, an outcome function q :
∏n
i=1Xi →
R, and selection functions δi : (Xi → R)→ P(Xi). A strategy for
player i is a function
σi :
i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi
that chooses a move contingent on the previous moves by other
players, and the set of strategy profiles is the set
Σ =
n∏
i=1
(
i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi
)
of tuples consisting of a strategy for each player. There is an obvious
play function
P : Σ→
n∏
i=1
Xi
producing the sequence of moves resulting from a strategy profile,
defined by course-of-values recursion, which in the base case uses
0∏
j=1
Xj → X1 ∼= X1
Given a strategy profile σ, we call P(σ) the strategic play of σ.
The best response relation B ⊆ Σ×Σ of a higher order sequential
game is defined by (σ, σ′) ∈ B iff
(P(σ[i 7→ σ′i]))i ∈ δi(λ(xi : Xi).q(Ui(xi, σ)))
where the unilateral deviation operator Ui is the evident function
Ui : Xi × Σ→
n∏
j=1
Xj
defined by course-of-values recursion, with (Ui(xi, σ))i = xi.
Strategy profiles σ with (σ, σ) ∈ B are called selection equilibria of
the sequential game.
In the case where the selection functions are argmax as defined
above, this agrees with the standard definitions of best responses and
Nash equilibria. Note that this is a strictly weaker definition than that
of optimal strategies from [4], which specialises to subgame perfect
equilibrium (a strengthening of Nash equilibrium) when the selection
functions are argmax [5].
III. OPEN GAMES
The primary objects of study in compositional game theory are
called open games. We start by giving the definition, and in the
remainder of this section we discuss its interpretation.
Definition 3: Let X,S, Y,R be sets. An open game G : (X,S)→
(Y,R) is defined to be a 4-tuple G = (ΣG ,PG ,CG ,BG), where
• ΣG is a set, called the set of strategy profiles of G
• PG : ΣG ×X → Y is called the play function of G
• CG : ΣG ×X ×R→ S is called the coplay function of G
• BG : X × (Y → R) → Rel(ΣG) is called the best response
function of G
Rel(ΣG) is the meet-semilattice of all endo-relations R ⊆ ΣG ×ΣG .
In general, we impose no conditions whatsoever on these components.
In practice, however, we are most interested in those open games
which are generated by certain constructions, some of which are
defined in this paper. There are class-many open games of a fixed type
(which causes the category of open games to be locally large), but
only set-many after restricting to those generated by a set of construc-
tions. We will represent a general open game G : (X,S) → (Y,R)
in diagrammatic form (where time flows from left to right) as
X Y
RS
G
In Section V we will build on this and discuss the graphical syntax
of open games. We interpret X as the type of observations that can
be made by G that inform the choice of a strategy and hence action,
and Y as the type of moves or choices. By that a game G is a process
that maps observations X to choices Y . The types R and S, on the
other hand, are ‘dual’ or ‘contravariant’ types and this is indicated
above by the arrows flowing in the reverse direction. We think of R
as the type of utility (type of values about which the players in G
have preferences) that actions might generate. Thus utility functions
that arise in standard game theory are simply functions Y → R. The
type S is dually called the coutility since it represents values that
are returned to the calling environment by the game so that they can
become utility for other processes. This is seen clearly and formally
within the definition of composition of open games where the utility
of one game (acting as the environment for the other) is computed
via the coplay function of the other game. We point this out explicitly
when discussing the composition of games.
The most straightforward parts of the definition of open games
are the first two components. It is intuitive that a game has a set of
strategy profiles and that, given a strategy profile and an observation,
we can run the strategy profile on the observation to obtain a choice.
To give a simple concrete example, suppose Y = A×B, and define
Σ = (X → A)× (X × A→ B)
and
P((σ1, σ2), x) = (σ1(x), σ2(x, σ1(x)))
This represents a two-player game of perfect information: the value
x is the input which the first player observes and then chooses a
using the strategy σ1. The second player observes both x and a and
chooses b using σ2. The pair (a, b) is taken to be the output.
To gain an intuition of coplay, let us first consider a very simple
situation. You receive your monthly income and upon observing
your bonus, you decide to buy a bottle of champagne. You go
to a wine shop and for the given price, you buy a bottle, which
gives you a certain utility. Here, the connection between choice and
reaction, between what you do and what comes back to you, is rather
immediate. Deciding is simple.
Open games model situations where the connection between your
action and what comes back to you is left open - in the same way
as with selection functions: by allowing for all possible contexts.
The only prerequisite for contexts is being well-typed. Coming back
to the example, suppose, instead of buying the bottle yourself, you
give an amount of money to your friend, a champagne aficionado,
with the request to buy a bottle for you. So, your action gives him
some money, and you expect a bottle of champagne and by that some
utility back from him. He observes your bonus and the amount of
money given to him, and will take some action that will bring back a
bottle of champagne from a yet unspecified environment. Ultimately,
he will hand back a bottle of champagne which will create utility
for you. This handing back of utility is computed through his coplay
function which computes the coutility to hand back.
Note, in the example we used the concept of utility, which, by
definition, is the real number maximised by classical game theoretic
agents. There is no requirement in the definition of an open game that
outcomes are either real numbers, or a linear resource such as money
nor that some utility is maximised at all. Indeed, slightly changing the
example, we could have defined coutility as belonging to a certain set
of possible types of wine. This flexibility may be seen as a necessary
side-effect of allowing compositionality, but can itself be useful in
modelling [11], [12].
Possibly the most important part of the definition is the best
response relation, which is defined relative to an arbitrary context
– as in the case of games modelled via selection functions. Hence,
an open game also has Nash equilibria relative to an arbitrary context.
A context consists of a state, which says what happened in the
past, and a utility function, expressed as a continuation, which says
what will happen in the future. Compositional game theory relies on
the observation that such relative best response relations provide a
strategic representation of games that can be composed.
Relationship with Lenses: Pairs of functionsX → Y andX×R→
S are equivalent to polymorphic lenses [18], [9]. Moreover, all open
games can be built from lenses in a way we now describe. Note first
that
• An element x : X is given by a lens (1, 1)→ (X,S). Call such
lenses points Pt(X,S)
• A function Y → R is a lens (Y,R)→ (1, 1). Call such lenses
co-points CoPt(Y,R)
Lemma 1: An open game G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is exactly
• A family of lenses, that is a set ΣG and, for each σ : ΣG , a lens
Gσ : (X,S)→ (Y,R).
• BG : Pt(X,S)× CoPt(Y,R)→ Rel(ΣG)
In such a situation, we often save notational overhead by writing the
lens Gσ as σ in the following way
(X,S)
σ
−→ (Y,R)
Lenses play a key role in the development of open games as they
hide many details which otherwise severely pollute the presentation.
More concretely, they encapsulate the purely algebraic parts of open
games, leaving us to focus on the strategic behaviour of the best-
response function. They also ensure all reasoning about open games
can take place diagrammatically in the category of lenses. As a
result, more recent work on open games has heavily exploited this
connection [10].
Relationship with Geometry of Interaction: It has been pointed out
to us that there is a connection between the geometry of interaction
(GoI) and open games. A central construction within GoI, the Int-
construction takes a traced monoidal category C and constructs
another category I(C) whose objects are pairs of objects of C, and
whose morphisms (X,S) → (Y,R) are maps X ⊗ R → Y ⊗ S.
If C is cartesian, this is equivalent to two functions X × R → Y
and X × R → S. If the former function does not use the input R,
we get precisely a lens. This restriction means that open games are
not completely symmetric and this explains why a trace operator is
not needed to define composition — one can simply calculate the
forwards/covariant part of the composition and use that to calculate
the backwards/contravariant part.
When the base category is traced cartesian monoidal, both lenses
and the Int-construction are defined, and the two composition oper-
ators agree. This means that there is an identity-on-objects functor
from the category of lenses to I(C), and this suggests it will be
possible to build a more symmetrical theory of open games with
computable strategies.
IV. EXAMPLES OF OPEN GAMES
An open game G : (1, 1) → (1, 1), where 1 = {∗}, consists (up
to isomorphism of sets) of a set ΣG of strategy profiles and a best
response relation BG : Rel(ΣG). Since (1, 1) will turn out to be the
monoidal unit of the monoidal category of open games, we call G a
scalar open game, following the terminology of [1].
Any existing notion of ‘game’ from which we can define a
best response function can be encoded as a scalar open game. For
example, consider the prisoner’s dilemma from Section II. This can
be represented as a scalar open game G : (1, 1) → (1, 1) with
ΣG = {C,D}
2 with the constant best response relation BG defined
by (σ, σ′) ∈ BG iff σ
′ = (D,D).
In this paper we will show that open games can be used to build
such examples compositionally. In the remainder of this section we
will define families of open games that we consider atomic, in the
sense that they are not built compositionally from smaller games.
These families are decisions, functions, and counits.
A decision is an open game that represents a single choice made
by an agent.
Definition 4: Let X and Y be sets. A (utility-maximising) decision
D : (X, 1)→ (Y,R) is an open game defined by the following data:
• ΣD = X → Y
• PD(σ, x) = σ(x)
• CD(σ, x, r) = ∗
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BD(x, k) iff σ
′(x) ∈ argmax k
A (pure) strategy for a single decision is a function that maps
possible observations that can be made by the agent, to possible
choices. Such a strategy is considered optimal in the context (x, k)
iff it maps the current state x to a maximising point of the current
continuation k.
The reason that the pre-deviation strategy σ plays no role in
(σ, σ′) ∈ BD(x, k) is that σ is considered the strategy played by
all other players besides the one currently under consideration, and
so it plays no role in a 1-player open game such as D. Put it in
another way: in a one-player game there is nothing for σ′ to be a
best response to.
The definition of a decision assumes an agent who maximises real-
valued utility. However, there is nothing inherent in the definition
of an open game that says this must be the case. Indeed, one can
argue that the additional generality is necessary to be compositional:
An aggregate of two maximising agents, if modelled as a selection
function-like object, is not necessarily maximising. The prisoner’s
dilemma is a standard example of an aggregate with behaviour that
is not (globally) maximising, that is to say, if the two players were
modelled as a single entity, they would choose (C,C). This is the
sense in which selection functions are a theoretical precursor to open
games.
Definition 5: Let X , Y and R be sets, and let δ : (Y → R) →
P(Y ) be a multi-valued selection function. We define an open game
Dδ : (X, 1)→ (Y,R) by the following data:
• ΣDδ = X → Y
• PDδ (σ, x) = σ(x)
• CDδ (σ, x, r) = ∗
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BDδ (x, k) iff σ
′(x) ∈ δ(k)
We will give an example of an open game with non-utility-
maximising decisions in Section VII.
Decisions are the only atomic open games that play a role in
strategic reasoning. We formalise this with the following definition.
Definition 6: Let G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) be an open game. We call
G strategically trivial if it satisfies the following two conditions:
• |ΣG | = 1 (say, ΣG = {∗})
• (∗, ∗) ∈ BG(x, k) for all contexts (x, k)
The first condition says that there is exactly one strategy, and so
there is no choice to be made. The second condition says that this
trivial strategy can never fail to be in equilibrium. The idea behind this
is that if a strategy profile fails to be an equilibrium, it should always
be because some player has an incentive to deviate. Strategically
trivial open games could also be called zero-player open games.
Definition 7: Let f : X → Y and g : R → S be functions.
We define a strategically trivial open game (f, g) : (X,S) →
(Y,R) with play function P(f,g)(x) = f(x) and coplay function
C(f,g)(∗, x, r) = g(r).
As a special case of this, a function f : X → Y can be ‘lifted’ to
an open game in two ways: covariantly as (f, id1) : (X, 1)→ (Y, 1),
or contravariantly as (id1, f) : (1, Y )→ (1, X).
The final class of atomic open games are the counits.
Definition 8: Let X be a set. We define a strategically trivial open
game εX : (X,X) → (1, 1) called a counit, with play function
PεX (∗, x) = ∗ and coplay function CεX (∗, x, ∗) = x.
Recall that backward-flowing values are ‘teleological’, that is, they
are future values about which agents are reasoning. The role of
counits is to identify an ordinary forward-flowing value as the value
about which some past agent is reasoning. This plays an important
role in the diagrammatic language of open games in the next section.
Note there is no dual unit of type (1, 1)→ (X,X) (the reader might
like to try to define one) which is a reflection of the fact that game
theory is not symmetric in its forward and backward looking facets.
Mathematically, open games will not form a compact closed category.
V. THE MONOIDAL CATEGORY OF OPEN GAMES
In this section we will define a pair of operators for composing
open games, categorical composition and monoidal product, which
correspond to sequential play and simultaneous play. These two
operators make open games into the morphisms of a symmetric
monoidal category (after quotienting by isomorphisms of strategy
sets). As morphisms of a monoidal category open games can also
be denoted by string diagrams, and we introduce this diagrammatic
language in the next section. While these two operators form the
core, we do not claim that they are a complete basis of operators for
building open games in any formal or informal sense. Indeed, other
operators are discussed in [7].
First we give the definition of categorical composition. This is a
form of sequential composition in which the choice made by the first
component is hidden, visible only to the second component but not to
the outside. Sequential play is more intuitive when the choices made
by both components are visible; this will be recovered as a derived
operator in Section VIII.
Definition 9: Given a pair of open games G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) and
H : (Y,R)→ (Z,Q), we define their composition H◦G : (X,S)→
(Z,Q) as follows. The set of strategy profiles is the cartesian product
ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH
The play function composes simply by composition of functions:
PH◦G((σ, τ ), x) = PH(τ,PG(σ, x))
The coplay function composes as follows:
CH◦G((σ, τ ), x, q) = CG(σ, x,CH(τ,PG(σ, x), q))
The best response relation
((σ, τ ), (σ′, τ ′)) ∈ BH◦G(x, k)
holds iff
(σ, σ′) ∈ BG(x, k
′)
and
(τ, τ ′) ∈ BH(PG(σ, x), k)
where k′ : Y → R is defined by
k
′(y) = CH(τ, y, k(PH(τ, y)))
Since the set of strategy profiles is usually a tuple consisting
of a strategy for each decision, the condition ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH
corresponds roughly to saying that the set of decisions in H ◦ G is
the disjoint union of the decisions in G and H. The play function
says that to play the sequential composition H ◦ G in state x with
strategy profile (σ, τ ), we first play G with σ in state x, obtaining a
state y for H, which we then play with τ .
The formula for composing coplay functions is hard to understand
intuitively, but successfully captures the informal intuition given for
coplay in section III. Alternatively, it can be seen as composition of
lenses [9].
Finally, we give the conditions for a strategy profile (σ′, τ ′) to be
a best response to (σ, τ ) in a context (x, k). This means that for each
player in G, σ′ must be rational assuming that all other players in G
play σ and all players in H play τ , and also that for each player in
H, τ ′ must be rational assuming that all players in G play σ and all
other players in H play τ . We can apply the compositionally-known
best response relations for G and H, after using these assumptions
to appropriately modify the context. For H the continuation remains
k, and the state x is modified to PG(σ, x) using the assumption that
players in G play σ. For G the state remains x, and the continuation
is modified to k′, using the interpretation of the coplay function CH
as the utility passed backward from H to G, with the assumption that
players in H play τ .
Open games trivially cannot form a category, because this com-
position operator is not associative on the nose: the strategy profiles
are
ΣI◦(H◦G) = (ΣG × ΣH)× ΣI
6= ΣG × (ΣH × ΣI)
= Σ(I◦H)◦G
There are three approaches to this problem. The first, which is
perfectly successful in practice, is to simply ignore it and informally
work up to isomorphic strategy sets. The second, which is attractive
from a theoretical point of view, is to define a bicategory of open
games in which the 2-cells are functions between strategy sets that
suitably commute with the remaining structure. The reason we do
not take this approach is that monoidal bicategories are notoriously
complicated, and generalising to a monoidal double category (whose
axioms are typically much easier to verify [20]) would take us too
far afield. (This is carried out in [10].) Therefore in this paper we
take the third approach, which is to define a suitable equivalence
relation on open games and then a category whose morphisms are
equivalence classes. This is equivalent to first defining a bicategory,
and then obtaining a 1-category by quotienting by invertible 2-cells.
Definition 10: Let G1, G2 : (X,S) → (Y,R) be open games. We
write G1 ∼ G2 if there is a bijection i : ΣG1 → ΣG2 such that
• PG1 (σ, x) = PG2(i(σ), x) for all x : X and σ : ΣG1
• CG1(σ, x, r) = CG2(i(σ), x, r) for all x : X , r : R and σ : ΣG1
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BG1(x, k) iff (i(σ), i(σ
′)) ∈ BG2(x, k) for all x : X ,
k : Y → R and σ, σ′ : ΣG1
Proposition 1: For each type (X,S)→ (Y,R),∼ is an equivalence
relation on the class of open games of that type.
The quotient under ∼ identifies open games with isomorphic
strategy profiles and best responses. This is close in spirit to the
concept of best response equivalence of games in classical game
theory [15, p. 52f], but has some strange consequences. For example,
let G be the scalar open game representing the prisoner’s dilemma
from the previous section, with ΣG = {C,D}
2 and (σ, σ′) ∈ BG
iff σ′ = (D,D). Now consider a 1-player game with 4 choices
A = {1, 2, 3, 4} and utility function k : A→ R given by k(x) = x.
Encoding this as a scalar open game H yields ΣH = A and
(σ, σ′) ∈ BH iff x
′ = 4, since 4 is again a dominant strategy for
the player. Then G ∼ H, and so in the quotient they will be equal
elements of the monoid of scalars, despite the fact that they represent
games with different numbers of players. However, this is a technical
consequence of working with an equivalence relation, and does not
happen if we instead use a bicategory or double category of open
games.
Proposition 2: ◦ is well-defined on equivalence classes, that is to
say, if G ∼ G′ and H ∼ H′ then H ◦ G ∼ H′ ◦ G′.
Definition 11: For each object (X,S), the identity open game
id(X,S) : (X,S) → (X,S) is the strategically trivial open game
with
• Pid(X,S)(∗, x) = x
• Cid(X,S) (∗, x, s) = s
Proposition 3: There is a category Game whose objects are pairs
of sets and whose morphisms are equivalence classes of open games.
The composition is ◦ and the identity on (X,S) is the equivalence
class of id(X,S).
In the previous section we defined a strategically trivial open game
(f, g) : (X,S) → (Y,R) given functions f : X → Y and g : R →
S. This defines a functor (−,−) : Set× Setop → Game.
Next we define the monoidal product of open games, which
corresponds to simultaneous play.
Definition 12: Let G1 : (X1, S1)→ (Y1, R1) and G2 : (X2, S2)→
(Y2, R2) be open games. We define an open game G1 ⊗G2 : (X1 ×
X2, S1 × S2)→ (Y1 × Y2, R1 ×R2) as follows:
• The set of strategy profiles is ΣG1⊗G2 = ΣG1 × ΣG2
• The play function is
PG1⊗G2((σ1, σ2), (x1, x2)) = (PG1(σ1, x1),PG2(σ2, x2))
• The coplay function is
CG1⊗G2((σ1, σ2), (x1, x2), (r1, r2))
= (CG1(σ1, x1, r1),CG2(σ2, x2, r2))
• The relation
((σ1, σ2), (σ
′
1, σ
′
2)) ∈ BG1⊗G2((x1, x2), k)
holds iff the relations (σ1, σ
′
1) ∈ BG1(x1, k1) and (σ2, σ
′
2) ∈
BG2(x2, k2) both hold, where
k1 : Y1 → R1 k2 : Y2 → R2
are defined by
k1(y1) = π1(k(y1,PG2 (σ2, x2)))
k2(y2) = π2(k(PG1(σ1, x1), y2))
Lemma 2: ⊗ is well-defined on equivalence classes.
Lemma 3: ⊗ defines a bifunctor Game×Game→ Game.
Theorem 1: Game is a monoidal category in which the monoidal
product on objects is (X1, S1) ⊗ (X2, S2) = (X1 × X2, S1 × S2)
and that on morphisms is previously defined. The monoidal unit is
the object I = (1, 1).
The structure morphisms of the monoidal category are inherited
from the monoidal category Set × Setop via the functor (−,−),
where Set is cartesian monoidal. Game is moreover symmetric
monoidal, with the symmetry inherited from Set× Setop.
A Lens-theoretic View: A cleaner approach arises if one factors the
definition of parallel and sequential composition via the use of lenses.
First note that the above definitions restrict to lenses meaning that
the category of lenses is symmetric monoidal. Just as open games
can be defined in terms of lenses, the categorical structure of open
games can similarly be defined in terms of the simpler categorical
structure of lenses.
Lemma 4: Let G : (X,S) → (Y,R) and H : (Y,R) → (Z, T )
be open games. Then the composite H ◦ G is the family of lenses
indexed by ΣG ×ΣH with the pair (σ, τ ) indexing the lens
(X,S)
σ
−→ (Y,R)
τ
−→ (Z, T )
Given a point x : (1, 1)→ (X,S) and a copoint x : (Z, T )→ (1, 1),
then ((σ, τ ), (σ′, τ ′)) ∈ BH◦G(x, k) holds iff
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BG(x, k ◦ τ ), and
• (τ, τ ′) ∈ BH(σ ◦ x, k)
Notice how lens composition hides all the details of how play
and coplay functions knit together in the composite game. In
particular, in the definition of composition, the function k′(y) =
CH(τ, y, k(PH(τ, y))) is merely the lens composite k ◦ τ . A
similarly simplified construction of the monoidal product of open
games via the monoidal product of lenses can also be given.
VI. STRING DIAGRAMS
We will now informally present the string diagram language for
open games. A formal presentation can be found in [9], which proves
a coherence theorem by which we can define an open game by its
string diagram, given interpretations of the atomic open games. We
refer the reader to [19] for a summary of graphical languages of
this sort. The language of open games is an extension of those of
symmetric monoidal categories, and similar to (but not exactly) a
fragment of compact closed categories.
The key idea of the string diagram language is to treat the
object (X,S) as a formal tensor product X ⊗ S∗, where −∗ is a
duality that is defined on objects but not on arbitrary open games.
Diagrammatically we represent this duality by an orientation on
strings, so a general object (X,S) is denoted by
X
S
and thus a general open game G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is denoted by
X Y
RS
G
More formally, we allow individual strings to represent covariant
objects of the form (X, 1), and contravariant objects of the form
(1, S). Then, up to isomorphism, a general object can be written
as a tensor product (X,S) ∼= (X, 1) ⊗ (1, S) of a covariant and
a contravariant object. If we define a duality operation on arbitrary
objects by (X,S)∗ = (S,X), then (X,S) ∼= (X, 1)⊗ (S, 1)∗. This
justifies the informal statement (X,S) = X ⊗ S∗, because we can
identify Set with a symmetric monoidal subcategory Set →֒ Game
by identifying X with (X, 1) and f with (f, id1).
Notice that since we also have (X,S) ∼= (S, 1)∗ ⊗ (X, 1), the
open game G can equally be denoted
X Y
RS
G
That is, the relative ordering of covariant and contravariant parts of
an object does not matter. More formally, the objects X ⊗ S∗ and
S∗ ⊗X are equal in the strictification of Game, and the symmetry
sX,S∗ is an identity.
Corresponding to each atomic open game we have a corresponding
‘atomic’ string diagram, which we compose by the usual operations
of end-to-end and side-by-side juxtaposition. For example, a utility-
maximising decision D : (X, 1)→ (Y,R) corresponds to a node
X
Y
R
D
If X is a 1-element set, we further restrict this to
Y
R
D
with the usual (purely syntactic) convention of using a triangle for
morphisms into or out of the monoidal unit.
Given a function f : X → Y , its covariant lifting (f, id1) :
(X, 1) → (Y, 1) and its contravariant lifting (id1, f) : (1, Y ) →
(1, X) are respectively denoted
X Yf XY f
The syntax of trapezia under reflection (with unoriented strings) is
used for the adjoint of a linear map by Bob Coecke and others, for
example in [3].
The deleting function X → 1 and diagonal function X → X2
lift to give a commutative comonoid on every covariant object, and
a commutative monoid on every contravariant object. We give these
the special syntax
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
The final atomic open games that we must give representations to
are the counits εX : (X,X)→ I . This is denoted by a bending wire
X
X
Since there is no natural strategically trivial open game I → (X,X),
we do not allow wires to bend in the opposite direction in our string
diagrams.
Covariant functions, contravariant functions and counits are related
by the counit law, stating that the string diagrams
X
Y
f
=
X
Y f
denote equal open games. That is to say, the diagram of open games
(X,Y ) (Y, Y )
(X,X) (1, 1)
(f, id1)⊗ id(1,Y )
id(X,1) ⊗ (id1, f) εY
εX
commutes (where the monoidal structure morphisms are implicit).
Given a diagram built from the pieces we have described, which
does not contain any wire bending in the illegal direction, we can
compositionally build an open game where
• Decision and function nodes are interpreted as the corresponding
atomic open game
• Side-by-side and end-to-end composition of diagrams is inter-
preted as monoidal product and categorical composition of open
games
• A backwards-bending wire is interpreted as the corresponding
counit
The coherence theorem for teleological categories [9] states that the
resulting open game is invariant under topological manipulations of
the diagram, including rotating function nodes around a bend using
the counit law, provided that the new diagram does not contain a wire
bending in the illegal direction. Several examples of interpreting a
diagram as an open game can be seen in the next two sections.
VII. SIMULTANEOUS MOVE GAMES
In this section and the next we will apply the theory of the
previous sections to demonstrate that various classes of games can
be represented as open games and can be built compositionally.
We begin with simultaneous move games. The decision D1,Xi :
I → (Xi,R) represents an agent who makes a choice from a set Xi
in order to maximise a real number.
Theorem 2: Let
G :=
n⊗
i=1
D1,Xi : I →
(
n∏
i=1
Xi,R
n
)
be a monoidal product of decisions. Then the set of strategy profiles
of G is equal to the set of pure strategy profiles of a simultaneous
move game with sets of choices Xi, namely
ΣG =
n∏
i=1
Xi
and, for any function q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n, the relation BG(∗, q) ⊆
ΣG ×ΣG is precisely the best response relation for the simultaneous
move game with outcome function q (and, hence, the fixpoints of
BG(∗, q) are the pure strategy Nash equilibria).
In particular, by the associativity of the monoidal product, the
monoidal product of an m-player and an n-player open game is an
m+ n-player open game.
Given a particular utility function q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n, consider
the covariant function
(q, 1) :
(
n∏
i=1
Xi, 1
)
→ (Rn, 1)
We take the monoidal product of this with an identity morphism and
then post-compose with a counit, to yield the strategically trivial open
game (
n∏
i=1
Xi,R
n
)
(q,1)⊗id(1,Rn)
−−−−−−−−−→ (Rn,Rn)
εRn−−→ (1, 1)
By the counit law, this can be equivalently written as
ε∏n
i=1Xi
◦ (id(∏n
i=1Xi,1)
⊗ (1, q))
Now consider the scalar open game
(1, 1)
⊗n
i=1D1,Xi−−−−−−−−→
(
n∏
i=1
Xi,R
n
)
(q,1)⊗id(1,Rn)
−−−−−−−−−→ (Rn,Rn)
εRn−−→ (1, 1)
This scalar open game has the property that its best response relation
B(∗, ∗), for the unique context (∗, ∗), is precisely the best response
function for the simultaneous move game with outcome function q.
D1,X1
D1,X2
q
X1
X2
R
R
R
R
Fig. 1. String diagram for simultaneous move game
D1
D2
X
X
X
X
Fig. 2. Simultaneous move game with non-utility-maximising players
For small values of n, we can visualise this scalar open game
as a string diagram. For example, when n = 2 the corresponding
string diagram is depicted in Figure 1. Here, for the first time we can
see how the information flow in a game is visualised with a string
diagram: the utility generated by the utility function is ‘fed back’ to
each agent via a counit.
The previous results can be strengthened to an arbitrary higher
order game (introduced in Section II) using the open games Dδ
associated to a selection function from Section IV, in which case
the fixpoints of the best response relation are selection equilibria. An
interesting special case of this is depicted in Figure 2, in which the
outcome that is ‘optimised’ by each player is nothing but the choice
of the other player. (Ignoring the types, this string diagram arises
from Figure 1 by replacing q with a symmetry, i.e. crossing wires;
this provides a nontrivial example of reasoning about the equivalence
of games from topological manipulations of string diagrams.) Without
imposing an order relation on the set of choices, it is not possible
to interpret D1 and D2 as utility-maximising decisions. Instead, by
interpreting D1 and D2 in suitable ways we can obtain directly
analogous results to the Keynes beauty contest example in [12].
We will consider three different ways of interpreting D1 and D2,
which result in three different games. If D1 = D2 are both Dfix,
where fix : (X → X)→ P(X) is the selection function
fix(k) = {x : X | x = k(x)}
the resulting scalar open game is a coordination game. In particular,
if X = {A,B} then the best response relation is the same as
Meeting in New York, the 2-player simultaneous move game with
utility maximising players and outcome function
q(x, y) =
{
(1, 1) if x = y
(0, 0) if x 6= y
In particular, the pure Nash equilibria and the fixpoints of BG(∗, ∗)
are (A,A) and (B,B).
Next, we interpret both D1 and D2 as the open game lifted from
the anti-fixpoint selection function
anti-fix(k) = {x | x 6= k(x)}
If we do this, then the resulting scalar open game G has the same
best response relation as a simultaneous move game with 2 utility
maximising players and outcome function
q(x, y) =
{
(0, 0) if x = y
(1, 1) if x 6= y
This is an anti-coordination game. If X = {A,B} then the pure
Nash equilibria and fixpoints of BG(∗, ∗) are (A,B) and (B,A).
Finally, we interpret D1 = Dfix and D2 = Danti-fix. This is a game
in which the first player would like to coordinate with the second,
and the second would like to differentiate from the first. This has
the same best response relation as matching pennies, the game with
outcome function
q(x, y) =
{
(1, 0) if x = y
(0, 1) if x 6= y
This game has no Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
VIII. SEQUENTIAL GAMES
In the previous section we showed that a simultaneous move game
can be represented as an open game using monoidal products of
decisions. In this section we will represent sequential games, in which
players can observe previous actions of other players before making
their choice.
We focus on the sub-class of finite sequential games from [4]
introduced in Section II, which are the finite extensive-form games
of perfect information in which at each stage a different player
chooses, and the player choosing and the set of possible choices are
determined only by the stage number and not the previous moves.
That is to say, distinct players 1, . . . , n sequentially make choices
from sets X1, . . . , Xn, with each player observing every previous
move. Relaxing each of these restrictions is possible but requires
more work (generally, defining additional composition operators on
open games, such as those in [7]), and so we focus on this sub-class
for simplicity.
Recall from Definition 4 that the choice of an element of Y after
observing an element of X by a utility-maximising agent is modelled
by the open game DX,Y : (X, 1)→ (Y,R) defined by
• ΣDX,Y = X → Y
• PDX,Y (σ, x) = σ(x)
• CDX,Y (σ, x, r) = ∗
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BDX,Y (x, k) iff σ
′(x) ∈ argmax k
The basic element of a sequential game is the open game D∆X,Y :
(X, 1) → (X × Y,R) denoted by the string diagram in figure 3.
Algebraically, this is (id(X,1) ⊗DX,Y ) ◦ (∆X , 1), where (∆X , 1) :
(X, 1) → (X × X, 1) is the lifting of the copying function X →
X ×X . By applying the definitions of the composition operators ◦
X
Y
R
X
DX,Y
Fig. 3. Definition of D∆X,Y
;
Gi D
∏
i
j=1 Xj ,Xi+1
∏i
j=1Xj
Xi+1
R
i
R
∏i
j=1Xj
R
i
Fig. 4. Recursive step of definition 13
and ⊗, the reader can verify that D∆X,Y is concretely given as follows,
up to natural isomorphism:
• ΣD∆
X,Y
= X → Y
• PD∆
X,Y
(σ, x) = (x, σ(x))
• CD∆
X,Y
(σ, x, r) = ∗
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BD∆
X,Y
(x, k), where k : X × Y → R, iff σ′(x) ∈
argmaxy:Y k(x, y)
Definition 13: Let X1, . . . , Xn be a sequence of sets. We recur-
sively define a sequence of open games
Gi : (1, 1)→
(
i∏
j=1
Xj ,R
i
)
as follows. The base case is G0 = id(1,1) : (1, 1) → (1, 1). In the
recursive step, Gi+1 is defined in terms of Gi and D∏i
j=1Xj ,Xi+1
by
the string diagram in Figure 4.
Theorem 3: Let X1, . . . , Xn be a sequence of sets and q :∏n
i=1Xi → R
n. Let
Gn : (1, 1)→
(
n∏
i=1
Xi,R
n
)
be defined as in Definition 13. Then
ΣGn =
n∏
i=1
(
i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi
)
is the set of strategy profiles of the n-player sequential game with
outcome function q, and BGn(∗, q) is its best response relation.
For example, a 2-player sequential game with outcome function
q : X × Y → R2 corresponds to the open game depicted in Figure
5. This game has a set of strategy profiles Σ = X × (X → Y ), and
the best response relation B ⊆ Σ× Σ is defined by (σ, σ′) ∈ B iff
σ
′
1 ∈ argmax
x:X
(q(x, σ2(x)))1
and
σ
′
2(σ1) ∈ argmax
y:Y
(q(σ1, y))2
D1,X DX,Y
q
X
X
X
Y
R
R
R
R
Fig. 5. Example sequential open game with 2 players
D1,X
DX,Y1
DX,Y2
q
X
X
X
Y1
Y2
R
R
R
R
Fig. 6. Hybrid sequential-simultaneous move game
We close this section by combining simultaneous and sequential
elements. Consider the open game in Figure 6. The game depicts a
situation where a player first makes a decision (D1,X ). This decision
is observed by two players who move simultaneously (DX,Y1 and
DX,Y2 ). As they move simultaneously they cannot observe each
others’ moves; they do observe the first player’s move though.
A possible economic story is: two companies use the same input
produced by a monopolist, the first player, who sets a price for the
input. For example the latter players could be rival car manufacturers,
and the first player a monopolist who produces tyres. Upon observing
the price, both competitors decide how much to produce. Profits result
accordingly.
The example illustrates how compositionality can be applied
to economic strategic situations. Modelling economic interactions
compositionally is very natural because the object itself is a com-
position of elements: A market is composed of competitors, buyers,
upstream input providers etc. A situation such as this hybrid simul-
taneous/sequential game is typically modelled as an extensive form
game of imperfect information. We suggest that the representation
as an open game, as well as being modular, is a more appropriate
representation of the underlying economic situation.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have introduced a compositional theory of games
that unlike classical game theory builds larger games from smaller
elements. Hence, a game in our theory is not modelled as one
monolithic entity but is constructed from elements which are glued
together by parallel and sequential composition. This makes game
theory modular.
The categorical tools which allow for compositional games reveal
deep connections to the theory of lenses as well as to the geometry of
interaction. At least to us, these connections were not obvious from
the outset and only later appeared after helpful comments by Jeremy
Gibbons and Tom Hirschowitz.
The broader goal of the compositional theory of games started in
this paper is to bring the full force of compositionality to economic
modelling. In this paper, we have made an important initial step by
showing that a compositional theory is possible. We have focused
only on simultaneous and sequential games, on Nash equilibria as
the solution concept, and have considered only pure strategies. Of
course, there are many more interesting questions to pursue.
First, an important class of games are repeated games, where
players engage in an interaction more than once, and especially
infinitely repeated games. It is well known that these games behave
differently than their one-shot versions. A prime example is the
prisoner’s dilemma where in the infinitely repeated version coop-
eration becomes a possibility for rational and selfish agents. These
games require two innovations: a refined equilibrium concept (that
is subgame perfect equilibria) as well as more general composition
operators. See [7] for initial results including the construction of final
coalgebras of certain functors on open games which can be used
to model infinitely repeated games and thereby bring the powerful
concept of bisimulation to bear on infinite games.
Secondly, the solution concept of Nash is built into the definition
of an open game. It is important to consider alternatives. One
categorically attractive point of view is pursued in [10] where open
games are taken as objects of a category and morphisms between
them are studied. This is particularly important if we want to define
open games, or operators on open games, by universal properties.
Thirdly, applications of game theory very commonly use mixed
(probabilistic) strategies, since there are games, such as matching
pennies, without a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Thus, it
is important to consider open games with mixed strategies. This
is possible but surprisingly difficult, and requires some heavier
category-theoretic tools, and is work in progress. A related extension
concerns games of incomplete information where some players do not
have access to all relevant informations, for instance other players’
utilities. Coalgebras are a natural way to study this extension [14].
Lastly, an important practical question is how open games can
be implemented and solved. Calculating with anything larger than a
trivial open game by hand is cumbersome and rather error-prone and
the definitions themselves have been developed alongside a prototype
Haskell implementation. Since open games were intended from the
beginning to be supported by software tools, we have started working
with a Haskell based prototype implementation of a string diagram
editor, a compiler that translates string diagrams into their algebraic
expressions, and an engine that processes the games for simulation,
equilibrium checking and other analysis.
Accordingly, one important application of open games is the
compositional development of algorithms to calculate equilibria.
Various hardness results in algorithmic game theory [16] state that
approximating solutions of arbitrary games is computationally hard
but this is usually given for classical and ‘monolithic’ games such as
normal-form games, without exploiting a formally defined composed
structure. On the other hand, solution algorithms for economic
models usually combine various numerical and statistical methods
like function approximation, root finding, integration and Monte
Carlo methods, see for example [22]. One area where compositional
game theory might have a significant impact is in systematically
(functorially) combining numerical methods in order to exploit the
compositional structure of the game to solve it.
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